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Summary 
This article provides an interpretation of the ecophenomenological dimension of Luce 
Irigaray’s work. It shows that Irigaray builds upon Heidegger’s recovery of the ancient sense 
of nature as physis, self-emergence into presence. But, against Heidegger, Irigaray insists that 
self-emergence is a material process undergone by fluid elements, such as air and water, of 
which the world is basically composed. This article shows that this ‘elemental materialist’ 
position need not conflict with modern science. However, the article criticises Irigaray’s claim 
that men and women inhabit radically different sexuate worlds. Although this claim has some 
phenomenological basis, ultimately it is undercut by Irigaray’s own elemental materialism, 
which implies that sexuate difference colours our perception but does not cleave it down a 
radical difference in kind. We can therefore accept and develop Irigaray’s contribution to 
ecophenomenology without her insistence on radical sexuate duality. 
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Irigaray’s Ecological Phenomenology: Towards an Elemental Materialism 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I provide an interpretation of the ecophenomenological dimension of Luce 
Irigaray’s work.i By ecophenomenology, I understand any thinking that addresses the 
ecological crisis by way of the phenomenological tradition with its mission to return ‘to the 
things themselves’, that is, to phenomena as they immediately present themselves to 
perception. To interpret Irigaray’s thought as ecophenomenological, I argue that she builds 
critically upon Heidegger’s return to nature in the sense of physis, but that she re-affirms that 
the world is of material nature, composed of fluid elements such as air and water which enter 
into successive perceptible forms that interpenetrate to make up the world. 
 The elemental materialism that Irigaray thus develops is ecophenomenological 
because it emerges from her reworking of ideas from the phenomenological tradition. She 
takes forward Heidegger’s return to physis as the spontaneous upsurge of perceptible forms, 
but she re-emphasises that physis is a process of material growth in which fluid elements take 
on shape. Her approach is ecophenomenological because she returns to the world as one that 
is originally not only natural but also material, and is the prior condition both of embodied 
beings capable of perceiving and of perceptual relations between these beings and the world. 
In this way she re-emphasises the dependence of human perceivers on the natural world 
within which they are situated. 
 One of Irigaray’s ecophenomenological tenets, then, is that we inescapably perceive as 
bodily and so sexuate beings. But, more than this, Irigaray problematically claims that men 
and women, boys and girls, inhabit radically different sexuate worlds. I argue that this claim 
is undercut by her own elemental materialism, which implies that sexuate difference colours 
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our perception but does not cleave it down a radical difference in kind. We can accept 
Irigaray’s ecophenomenology without her insistence on radical sexuate duality. 
 Another question is whether Irigaray’s return to the ancient elements – air, fire, water, 
earth, and possibly others too (light, stone, wood) – must conflict with modern scientific 
accounts of the chemical elements and their atomic structures. That would be unfortunate, for 
ecophenomenologists should not throw modern science overboard. We owe the sciences our 
knowledge of climate change, species and habitat loss, ocean and soil degradation, and other 
facets of the ecological crisis. Having said that, on ecological grounds we also need to 
criticise the technoscientific project of knowing and controlling the whole of nature. We can 
meet both needs by recognising that the sciences give us part – but only part – of the truth of 
nature. The sciences tell us about the underlying structures of nature, at a high level of 
abstraction from the concrete ways that these structures are instantiated, whereas perception 
informs us about the more concrete character of nature, including its elemental make-up.ii 
Indeed, I will argue, perception tells us something about not only nature as it presents itself to 
perception but also nature as it must intrinsically be for the particular perceptible face that it 
offers to be possible. But perception does not tell us everything either, which opens space for 
science and perception to learn from one another. Thus, although phenomenology was born in 
antagonism to scientific naturalism, phenomenology and naturalism – i.e. scientific accounts 
of natural and bodily processes – can actually work together, as we need them to do for 
ecophenomenological thinking to be possible.iii Yet, since both these ways of knowing nature 
have inherent limits, their combination does not add up to total comprehension of the natural 
world. Human knowledge cannot overreach the natural world, which sets limits to the 
technoscientific project of total understanding and control.  
 
2. Two Phenomenological Strands: Everyday Realism and Deep Process 
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Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine rightly claim that ‘the history and development of the 
phenomenological tradition ... reveals numerous interwoven strands that lead, through their 
own internal tensions, toward the emergence of ecological reflection’.iv In this section I 
provide a background for my interpretation of Irigaray by identifying two of these strands that 
we can see converging in her work. The first strand arises from the core phenomenological 
project of returning to the things themselves, zu den Sachen selbst. Along this strand, 
phenomenology becomes a kind of everyday realism about things and the world that these 
things compose.v The second strand arises from Heidegger’s turn from beings to being and 
his subsequent turn towards physis. This is a re-orientation towards the deep temporal process 
of upsurgence into presence, which subtends and preconditions all appearing beings. 
 Let us begin with the everyday realist strand. For Husserl, to return to things 
themselves was to bracket theoretical assumptions and abstractions so that I can redirect my 
attention towards what is certain: what is given (gegeben) to my experience – or, in Merleau-
Ponty’s rendition, to perception as my pre-theoretical medium of contact with the world. In 
attending to this I return to things themselves because what is given to me is things, directly – 
I do not access things indirectly through the medium of ‘ideas’ or ‘representations’: those are 
mere theoretical constructs.vi Moreover, what is there is never individual things simply as 
such, but rather things nested and entangled together into contexts, each open onto and 
entangled with further contexts, thus ultimately invoking the totality of all such contexts – the 
world. What we encounter always shows itself as part of this single whole world. Hence, 
Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘We must not ... wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must 
instead say: the world is what we perceive’.vii As a single whole encompassing all beings and 
perceivers, the world is shared in common. 
 Thus there is a strand of phenomenology that is ontological in a fairly traditional sense 
of ontology, as inquiry into the real character of the beings that exist and compose the world, 
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albeit that these beings are now those given to us in perception rather than being assumed to 
lie beyond any veil of perception.viii It is through perception that we learn about things and the 
world that they make up, and about their real characteristics, where one of the characteristics 
that things and the world really have is to appear to us. To perceive things and the world is to 
apprehend them through the senses that we have only as embodied beings, while, being 
embodied, we are inescapably located within the world. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty maintains, 
our senses initially co-operate together in perception, which involves an original synaesthesia 
(PP 266). As such, a constitutive element of our sensory contact with beings is their showing 
themselves to us as tangible and, as such, as physical: occupying place, presenting resistance, 
solidity, and density. 
 Admittedly, we do not always perceive things exactly as they are independently of 
their being perceived, given the contribution of our sensory powers and the fact that, since we 
are embodied, our perception is always imbued with desire. Yet this distinction between 
appearance and reality arises within perception: beings present themselves as going beyond 
what they show me, having hidden depths. While we can probe these depths, this opens up an 
ever-receding horizon of further depths, so that perception inescapably presents itself as 
limited by the inexhaustible excess or transcendence of the world (PP xviii-ix). Even so, this 
is another real characteristic of beings and the world about which perception informs us: that 
they extend beyond the aspects that they present to us. 
 It might be objected that phenomenology cannot be reduced to being ontological in 
this sense – as investigating the real characteristics of entities (beings, étants, seiende) – 
because this perpetuates the neglect of being (l’être, Sein) that Heidegger and other 
phenomenologists informed by him question. Moreover, the everyday realist strand already 
points to the difference between being and beings. For when perception discloses the 
inexhaustible background encompassing all things, what is revealed is the fullness of being 
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that is never exhausted by any finite entities, and that is revealed to us, paradoxically, as 
necessarily transcending our knowledge. This leads to a second phenomenological strand, 
Heidegger’s recovery of being – that through which everything that is is – which, in his later 
work, he comes to think as the necessarily temporal upsurgence by which beings come into, 
endure for a while in, and pass out of being. This takes Heidegger towards ecology, for he 
interprets this movement whereby things come to appearance as nature, albeit nature restored 
to its ancient Greek sense as physis.ix Crucial here is his long 1939 essay ‘On the Essence and 
Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, I’. 
 Heidegger reads Aristotle as turning away from pre-Socratic towards Latin thought, 
setting the West on a course that has culminated in modern technoscience. Yet Aristotle 
retains traces of the pre-Socratic conception of nature as physis, a conception relatively 
faithful to immediate perception. Aristotle made conceptual shifts, though, that prepared for 
the Latin concept of natura, according to which the nature of something is what that thing at 
root is. A thing’s nature is its essence, innate constitution, or fixed principle (‘she can’t do 
otherwise, it’s in her nature’). This, Heidegger says, is our accepted, inherited common-sense 
about nature. To shake this common-sense we must trace its Aristotelian roots whilst also 
unearthing the contrasting elements in Aristotle – his pre-Socratic residues. 
 According to Heidegger, Aristotle begins his account of nature in the Physics from the 
thought that natural beings are in movement – not merely locomotion but also growth and, 
generally, change – and that this character of being in movement is what makes these beings, 
specifically, natural (beings-from-physis). They are self-changing, self-moving, whereas an 
artefact only ever ‘moves’ – comes into existence or changes place or character – when an 
artisan makes it do so, guided by an idea (eidos) of its purpose (telos). Natural and artificial 
beings thus differ radically, for artefacts come to exist by virtue of human ideas and skill, 
whereas natural beings come to exist just of themselves. For Heidegger, this distinction 
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reflects Aristotle’s pre-Socratic inheritance, for the pre-Socratic view was that beings come to 
be just by surging up, erupting into existence, with no pre-set telos within them to direct or 
limit this pure eruption (or genesis). ‘The rose has no why; it blooms because it blooms’, as 
the seventeenth-century German mystic Angelus Silesius later put it.x There can be no telos 
prior to the sheer eruption into being, because something must first exist before it can have a 
telos: the upsurge into being is therefore brute, radically original, and is physis, through which 
all things are. 
 Physis thus is the pure event of coming to manifestation, or the movement of 
appearing: ‘we find what is physis-like once when we come upon a placing into the 
appearance’ (Gestellung in das Aussehen).xi For things to appear or disclose themselves to us, 
then, is for things to be natural in the original sense – of-physis, spontaneously coming forth. 
Because artisans, too, must first appear before they can make artefacts, physis precedes and 
enables artificial creation: all that is is originally of-physis. 
 These claims become proto-ecological through their connection with Heidegger’s 
critique of technoscience. For him, the already debased Latin concept of natura has 
degenerated further into the technoscientific project of using all of physis – all that is self-
generating – as energy-sources. Believing that things have fixed ‘natures’, guiding essences 
that power them, we have become ambitious to know these essences so that we can 
manipulate and control things’ behaviour and thus unlock their powers. Yet if physis is a 
radical upsurge whose movement and direction we cannot possibly fully predict or control, 
then the hubris and danger of technoscience stand exposed. If we returned to appearance as 
physis, we would have to acknowledge that physis exceeds our epistemic and practical powers 
and so live more humbly, less hubristically. 
 Heidegger’s critique of technoscience, however, leaves little room for productive 
conversation between phenomenology and the sciences. We need such conversation if we are 
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to understand the physical processes fuelling the ecological crisis, as well as the broader 
material nature of organism-environment interactions, as ecophenomenology requires. Here 
the first strand of phenomenology can help – inquiry into the real character of the beings that 
compose the world, as material beings that reveal their physical qualities to our touch and 
other senses. Along this strand, phenomenology investigates the same physical beings that the 
sciences study, albeit through perception rather than theoretical abstraction. This shared 
subject-matter permits the two approaches to learn from and inform one another. For 
ecophenomenological purposes, then, we need to combine Heidegger’s return to physis with 
an orientation towards beings in their physical make-up. 
 Irigaray undertakes this. She builds on Heidegger’s recasting of nature as physis, his 
return to morphe as perceptible appearance, and his attention to this spontaneous movement 
into appearance. Yet, in her 1983 book The forgetting of air in Martin Heidegger (hereafter 
Forgetting), Irigaray objects that if we prioritise being over beings – over perceptible, 
tangible, material beings (les étants physiques, be they living or non-living bodies or their 
material elements) – then we downgrade materiality in ontological status. From Heidegger’s 
perspective something can only be material (or immaterial) if it first is, i.e. comes to 
appearance; therefore, coming to appearance cannot itself be material; thus materiality 
becomes ontologically derivative or secondary, when it should be recognised as primary. Let 
us examine Irigaray’s criticism then see how she responds to Heidegger’s perceived failings 
by bringing together the two phenomenological strands considered earlier. 
 
3. Irigaray, Heidegger, and Material Nature 
In this section I reconstruct first Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger and then the elemental 
materialist position implied by this critique. They both require interpretive reconstruction 
because Forgetting is not a systematic treatise but moves between Heidegger’s texts and 
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Irigaray’s reflections, often posing unanswered questions. Furthermore, Irigaray does not 
simply reject Heidegger’s approach to physis. Rather, she tries to extricate his recovery of 
physis from (what she sees as) his privileging of form and subjectivity over the materiality of 
the world. 
 Amongst Irigaray’s recurring questions to Heidegger is ‘Of what [is] this is?’:xii 
The clearing of the opening, “of what” [«en quoi»] can this be? – one could have 
asked him. This old philosophical question never seems to have been put to him. ... 
Too “sensible”, or too “physical”? ... “Of what” [is] being, this is not “posed”. It is, 
always, pre-supposed. Fore-seeable, pre-established. ... And the question: “of what” is 
thought made, being left unthought. (FA 3/11) 
This deceptively simple question pertains to Heidegger’s conception of physis. Admittedly, 
Irigaray does not explicitly reference his paper on Aristotle on physis, but her book contains 
few direct references at all, whilst as Helen Fielding observes ‘there seem to be echoes of this 
paper [on Aristotle’s Physics] throughout The Forgetting of Air’xiii – not surprisingly, since 
Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle on physis is fundamental for his subsequent work. 
 In particular, Irigaray’s ‘of what’ question targets Heidegger’s overt privileging of 
form (morphe) over matter (hyle). The form/matter contrast organises Aristotle’s view of 
nature, but Heidegger radically reinterprets these concepts in the context of his complaint that 
Aristotle covers up the original meaning of physis and thereby paves the way for Latin 
thought. Aristotle does this (Heidegger charges) by grasping the self-movement of natural 
beings as their fabricating themselves in line with an inner purpose or blueprint: so that, for 
example, an acorn contains in nucleus a blueprint (its telos) for becoming an oak tree, which 
moulds its growth and behaviour. Aristotle thus misunderstands the natural being as a self-
making artefact. This misunderstanding is bound up with Aristotle’s teleological and 
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hylomorphic theory that a natural being’s form structures its matter and supplies the telos 
governing its development. 
 As Heidegger also argues, Aristotle put forward this model against Antiphon the 
sophist. Antiphon held that the nature of any entity is the substratum of matter of which it is 
composed, of which its form(s) are mere superficial modifications.xiv For Heidegger, Aristotle 
rightly re-emphasises form, but under a concept of form that is already diminished compared 
to pre-Socratic thought. Aristotelian form is an intelligible structuring principle that endures 
through change and so can be held steady before the mind to be known. Originally, though, 
morphe meant something quite different: visible appearance, the shifting, fluctuating 
perceptible surface that presents itself to us. Physis as presencing into appearance was, 
therefore, self-placing into morphe. 
 What, then, of hyle? For Heidegger, ‘The self-placing into the appearance always lets 
something be present in such a way that in the presencing an absencing simultaneously 
becomes present’ (in der Anwesung eine Abwesung anwest; ECP 227/297). When something 
grows into a new form, its old form disappears – becoming a sapling, an acorn stops being an 
acorn; becoming a mature tree, it is no longer a sapling. More basically, when any entity 
comes into appearance the process of appearing that makes this possible cannot appear, 
because that process is the prior condition of anything’s being in appearance. This generative 
process remains in the background, hidden, invisible. This invisible background underlying 
visible appearance is what Aristotle reconceives as intrinsically formless material stuff that 
gets structured by form (already effectively in the sense it will have for the Latins as forma). 
Originally, though, Heidegger claims, hyle meant hiddenness (Verborgenheit), the withdrawal 
or pulling-back (Entzug) into darkness that shadows all coming-to-light. 
 Irigaray objects that Heidegger strips hyle of its materiality, its stuff-ness (that ‘of 
which’ it is), recasting hyle as invisible process, pure generative activity without substance. 
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He neglects the ‘material substratum’ – le substrat matériel – of what appears (FA 41/41). 
Heidegger could reply that to be material something must first be; hence must appear; hence 
must already have a subtending background of invisibility – so that the background must 
precede and cannot possibly consist of any material substance. Nonetheless, Irigaray insists, 
the world ends up cast as a strangely de-materialised place where things (choses) ‘cut from 
their natural enrootedness, float about, wandering the propositional landscape. The phuein of 
physical beings [étants physiques] is forgotten in the physis of the logos’ (FA 86/81). Irigaray 
objects that hyle is understood here in relation to appearance, as the invisibility that makes 
appearance possible, the nurturing soil enabling form to shine forth. Appearance, in turn, is to 
us, perceivers, those for whom there is a world. Irigaray thus suggests that the pre-Socratic 
thinker to whom Heidegger is most loyal is Parmenides, for whom being and thought form a 
circle in which being is always correlated with the thought that thinks it (FA 2/9). If hyle 
enables morphe and morphe is for the perceiver, then – despite Heidegger’s rejection of the 
subject-object dichotomy – all that is is for perceiving and speaking beings: ‘Physis is always 
already subjected to ... the technology and science of the logos’ (FA 86-87/81). 
 These claims are not wholly charitable: for Heidegger, logos is not originally language 
but the self-gathering of things into appearance that first makes true and false speech and 
judgements about things possible. Irigaray can reply that this gathering is still into appearance 
to the perceiver. Yet, Heidegger clarifies, to appear is to become available to be seen in a 
given way even if what appears is not actually seen: ‘‘Iδέα is “the seen” [das Gesichtete], but 
not in the sense that it becomes such only through our seeing [das Sehen]. Rather, ἰδέα is what 
something visible offers to our seeing’ (ECP 210/275). Further, Heidegger rejects the whole 
modern conception of those who see as representing, projecting, valuing subjects, re-
emphasising the dependency of our seeing on what offers itself to us. Even so, Heidegger thus 
remains concerned to think physis in inextricable relationship with those to whom it offers 
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(bietet) its appearances – in effect, human beings. For Heidegger, what is simply is what 
appears to us, and nature is the event of coming to appearance to us, so that perceiver and 
nature as physis are strictly correlative to one anotherxv (belonging together in Ereignis). ‘The 
place [là] where – and whence– man draws his origins, he says, would not be, without the 
being [l’être] of man. The loop is closed up’, Irigaray objects (FA 26/29). 
 For Irigaray, in contrast, the nature in which we originate is prior to human perceivers 
both temporally (from an ecological standpoint, the human perceiver emerges from the pre-
human world through evolution and deep chemical processes whereby non-living matter came 
to life) and, above all, causally. Perceiving bodies can exist only as a derivative modification 
and development of material nature, something which is possible only if nature first pre-exists 
perceivers so as to develop into them. ‘[T]he being [l’être] of man is just one part of beings 
[n’est qu’une partie de l’étant] ... beings, physical beings, exceed the being of man [l’étant, 
les étants physiques, débordent l’être de l’homme]’ (FA 87-88/82). Things cannot be 
available to be seen – cannot be even potentially visible – until there are perceivers who can 
potentially see these things, even if they do not actually do so. Yet Heidegger falsely portrays 
the world as giving itself to potential perception even before the world has developed into the 
shape of embodied perceivers. Thus Heidegger casts physis and the perceiver as 
symmetrically dependent upon one another, when really the dependency is asymmetrical, of 
perceiver on physis and not vice versa. This ties in with Irigaray’s complaint that Heidegger 
neglects the material embodiment of the perceiver (FA 26-27/29-30). For her, the perceiving 
being is necessarily embodied because it derives from the material world. Because Heidegger 
does not adequately grasp that derivation, neither can he fully appreciate that the perceiver is 
a bodily being. 
 These objections are still not wholly fair. Heidegger regards hyle as a positive, 
productive excess (Übermaß) over morphe, an excess containing more than can ever appear. 
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Thus while hyle generates and enables morphe, hyle outstrips and is never exhausted in 
morphe. In consequence, perceptible forms also contain an irreducible excess beyond what we 
perceive in them. If hyle is not simply for morphe, neither is morphe ever simply for the 
perceiver. To this extent Heidegger does acknowledge our dependency on a source that 
exceeds our cognition, being knowable only (paradoxically) as the movement of absencing 
and withdrawal. Moreover, he identifies this source with nature in its aspect as hyle, which 
implies a radical dependency of human perception on material nature. Yet, because Heidegger 
ultimately privileges morphe and thereby casts perceiver and being as belonging together in 
appearance, he becomes led back towards understanding hyle in relation to perception, albeit 
the negative relation of withdrawing from appearance. Despite himself, therefore, Heidegger 
cannot fully explore the positive, productive excess of hyle. 
 Irigaray aims to correct this oversight by pressing the questions of what hyle is and 
therefore what physis is made of – in defiance of the fact that these questions are 
wrongheaded from Heidegger’s perspective. Her defiant inquiry into ‘that (of) which’ physis 
is has a feminist motivation. Western tradition, including Aristotle, has favoured form over 
matter as constant over changing, intelligible over sensible, and male over female.xvi 
Heidegger diverges: for him, form visibly manifests itself to our senses and comes to do so 
temporally; form is changing and perceptible, not eternal and intelligible. Yet from Irigaray’s 
perspective he still privileges form over matter, a hierarchy that retains its historically 
entrenched gender connotations. To explore the materiality of physis, instead, is to re-
emphasise what is symbolically female. 
 To explore hyle Irigaray builds on Heidegger’s concept of physis as dynamic upsurge, 
but she re-affirms that this upsurge into appearance is a material upsurge. What does it mean 
to say that forms materially surge up, that genesis is material, that things materially emerge 
into presence? One answer can be found in the contemporary project of ‘material feminism’, 
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which often has an ecofeminist slant. Rather than shying away from materiality for fear of 
falling into essentialism and biological determinism, material feminists rethink materiality as 
an active, dynamic, creative force – an agency of change and not a static source of limits, in 
which feminists can find an ally in their efforts to change society for the better.
xviii
xvii If matter is 
dynamic, reciprocally dynamism is material – where for most material feminists it is the 
sciences that specify what it is for something to be material, be these Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, neurobiology, or quantum physics.  Material feminists thus work with scientific 
theories to bring out how they cast matter as dynamic. 
 Irigaray instead probes what it is for something to be material by retrieving the pre-
Socratic elements – especially air, of which she reminds Heidegger (and water, of which she 
reminds Nietzsche in Marine Lover; and fire, of which she intended to remind Marx in her 
never-published text on his work). This is a phenomenological approach, since she takes it 
that these elements are immediately perceptibly evident – ‘The excess of air is ... so 
immediately “evident” ... that he did not think of it’ (FA 40/41), she says of Heidegger, 
accusing him of taking an insufficiently phenomenological approach to physis and instead 
relying on abstract theoretical concepts (physis, hyle, entelechia, dynamis, etc.). We might 
object that the four elements are only directly perceptible to those who approach the world 
through theory: specifically through the pre-Socratic framework for classifying the world. But 
Irigaray would likely reply that the pre-Socratics adopted that classification because their way 
of doing science was to cultivate faithfulness to, not abstract from, perceptible givens. If the 
idea of the four elements constitutes a theory, this is not in the modern sense of an abstract 
explanatory framework but in a distinctively ancient sense as a description that crystallises 
what is concretely perceptible. 
 Let me now reconstruct Irigaray’s view of the elements before pulling out its 
ambiguities. Air, water, fire: these and other fluid, shifting, boundary-crossing substances are 
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what enters into form and are that ‘of which’ coming to presence (physis) consists. These 
flowing, malleable, plastic materials take on form not by having some external framework 
imposed on them, but by constituting forms in entering into them. Reciprocally, these 
elements are not external to their forms; rather, the way that the elements are fluid is that they 
are in continual unrest and so exist only in the process of entering into successive forms (and 
persisting, always temporarily, under the resulting forms). So fluid matter is physis as the 
process of ferment, change and growth by which forms arise; equally, physis is fundamentally 
hyle, pace Heidegger for whom ‘morphe – not just more than hyle but in fact alone and 
completely – is physis’ (ECP 222/290). While Irigaray thus sides with Antiphon in privileging 
matter over form, unlike Antiphon she finds no permanence in matter, only the dynamism that 
Heidegger finds in physis. The elements thus straddle – and, by straddling, undermine – the 
divide between beings and being as physis: the elements are material, but their materiality is 
to be in incessant movement and growth into form. 
 How does matter assume form? Attending to perceptible occasions when this happens, 
we find that formation results from original movement within matter – for example, the 
turbulence of water and air by which they enter into eddies and currents. Kristeva says 
something similar of ‘primal matter’ (chora): against Plato, she holds that chora is no passive 
receptacle but an original volatility and mobility that, of its own rhythmic movements, takes 
on form.xix Presumably this explains how different forms become constituted: as matter stirs, 
jostles, it sifts itself into pockets with different qualities – more or less dense, fluid, solid, 
static, volatile, explosive, etc. The same volatility continues once matter has assumed form, 
causing it to shift its forms, stretch at their boundaries, pull different forms into contact then 
tear them apart. Thus when the beings that matter forms – beings, composed of hyle, that are 
physical (étants physiques), are bodies – impinge on one another’s boundaries they may 
rebound, recoil, or their matter may overflow its bounds so that these beings interpenetrate, 
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more or less temporarily or completely. These processes give rise to the ever-unfinished, 
ever-developing world. 
 Now, the ambiguities. For Irigaray, the fluid matters composing the world are the four 
(or more) elements as concretely perceived. We directly perceive these elements in their 
forms, as we see the sea in the waves, although the sea exceeds any particular wave 
formation. We apprehend, too, the concrete qualities that characterise these elements – 
water’s fluidity, clarity, density, coldness, etc. Likewise, the forms into which matter enters 
are concretely perceptible: the form of a deep, wide, slow-moving river, for instance. Rather 
than being invisible hyle appears, then, and is ‘the open itself – there is no need for opening or 
re-opening for one who has not forgotten its nature’ (FA 8/15).  
 Yet these claims seem to fit badly with the view of nature-subject relations implied by 
Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger. On that view, material nature preconditions subjects and 
their perceptions, which nature generates by virtue of its intrinsic character, its generative 
power. But this intrinsic character cannot be simply the same as the way that nature appears to 
concrete perception, for nature’s perceptible character arises only insofar as nature comes into 
(at least potential) relationship with perceivers. This is particularly so given the materiality of 
perception, as Irigaray understands it. Because all beings consist of formed matter, perceivers 
too are material beings, enjoying ‘the subsistence of a living body that draws its life from 
fluid materials’ (FA 83/78). We can only perceive on this basis, that of our corporeal and 
sensory forms – from our bodily location in space, for instance: aperspectival seeing is 
impossible. Only as this material body, corporeally interpenetrated by other things around me, 
can I apprehend those things – through light’s physical touch on my eyes, through the 
movements of air by which sounds reverberate in my ears.xx Experience arises in this material 
interpenetration of bodies: ‘... the subject and the “things” [choses], “things” among 
themselves, are in a relation of interpenetration ... Passage between them, but also, in a 
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different way, between them and the living subject, happens by an immediate and instant 
penetration’ (FA 84/79). ‘Would being and thinking be made of the same matter?’, Irigaray 
also muses, ‘Of the same element? – which would explain their mutual attraction?’ (FA 
3/11).xxi 
 Because perception arises in this material interpenetration of perceiving body with 
body perceived, the forms of the perceiving body – its sense-organs, situation, desires – 
contribute to perception. This seems to confirm that elemental matter cannot have 
intrinsically, prior to its having generated any perceptual relations, the same character that it 
presents to perception. Seemingly, then, fluid matters are as they present themselves to 
perception (as air, water, fire, etc.) under the concrete forms they show to perception (that of, 
e.g., a deep wide river), but also are not as they present themselves but rather have intrinsic 
characters that inescapably go beyond what is available to perception. Having stated this 
ambiguity, though, we can now see that it is revealing, not damaging. The ambiguity is itself 
given to perception: the elements and their concrete forms present themselves as being as they 
appear to us and as going beyond that appearance, harbouring further unknown features. 
Furthermore, from how the elements and their forms appear we can know something – not 
everything – about their intrinsic character. Because perception is an interpenetration, in 
which what is perceived is not passive, the intrinsic material character of elements and their 
bodily forms contributes to how they appear; their appearance is partially grounded in their 
intrinsic character. So, that intrinsic character must be such that it is possible for the elements 
and their forms to appear as they do. A thing must have the intrinsic character capable of 
contributing to its particular appearance: if air, water, or fire appear fluid and excessive to our 
grasp, part of the reason for that is that these elements really are volatile and mobile. If the 
concrete forms that we encounter appear to shift and change (a bud unfurls day by day; a 
flower dies day by day), this is partly because these forms really are phases in a process of 
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growth. And if things present themselves as composed of air, fire, water, etc., this is because 
things really have different levels of volatility, elasticity, density, etc. 
 Thus, through perception we can know something about the intrinsic make-up of 
things: that they are fundamentally composed of fluid matters continually growing into 
successive forms. We cannot know everything about how things are intrinsically, for their 
fluidity means that they always exceed our grasp and our desires, situation, etc. also 
contribute to perception. But, correlatively, the interpenetration of bodies that constitutes 
perception depends on bodies being permeable and so fluid, a fluidity that perceivers and 
perceived share. As such, the very fact that the perceiver contributes to perception is revealing 
of basic shared fluidity, again confirming that the world is intrinsically fluid.  
 Phenomenology, then, has an important role to play in disclosing the nature of the 
world as it is intrinsically, not only as it is directly perceived. Science, on its own, is not 
sufficient to account for the world’s intrinsic nature. Rather, scientific abstraction from 
perception and concrete perception can and should inform one another. Science may tell us 
about the atomic structures of the elements, but perception tells us something about the more 
concrete yet still intrinsically real characters of the elements in which these atomic structures 
are instantiated: that they must have something of the fluidity, volatility, elasticity, etc., that 
we perceive in them. 
 As I have interpreted it, Irigaray’s revival of the elements enables productive dialogue 
between perception and science – dialogue that ecophenomenology requires. In my 
interpretation, Irigaray’s materialism also unites the two phenomenological strands discussed 
earlier: everyday realism about physical beings and attention to the deep temporal process 
subtending all existence. On the realist side, perception gives us (some) knowledge of beings 
in their perceptible appearance and in their intrinsic material character. On the process-
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oriented side, this material character is to be in continual ferment, unstable, inexhaustibly 
productive, a character of which we can only ever know partially. 
 A potentially serious problem with Irigaray’s elemental materialism, however, is her 
insistence on radical sexuate difference, to which I now turn. 
 
4. Sexuate Difference Reconsidered   
For Irigaray, we can only perceive as beings who both have and are our bodies, bodies that 
are made of material stuff. Fluid elements – mucous, blood, water – congeal into our organs, 
flesh, and bones and pull these forms together to constitute our living bodies. Since our bodies 
constitute how we perceive, and our bodies are sexuate (sexué), it follows for Irigaray that we 
inescapably perceive as sexuate beings, in ways coloured and affected by our sexuate powers 
and structures. But how deeply does our sexuation shape our perception? 
 In her recent work Irigaray has increasingly emphasised that our sexuation does not 
merely qualify perception but shapes it so fundamentally that men and women inhabit 
different ‘worlds’.xxii This claim, I will argue, is problematic: Irigaray overestimates the 
impact of sexuation on perception, and fails to question whether societal gender norms have 
amplified this impact beyond what it would otherwise be. We need to consider how far this 
problem damages Irigaray’s materialist contribution to ecophenomenology. 
 The difference between sexuate worlds, Irigaray maintains, is that women are oriented 
more towards relations with other subjects than with objects and men, conversely, more 
towards objects than subjects.xxiii Women prioritise intersubjectivity, men subject-object 
interactions such as tool use or object manipulation. By speaking of different ‘worlds’, 
Irigaray suggests that these orientations exert a global effect on perception, shaping along 
different lines the entire way that men and women experience. These different orientations 
lead us to find different elements of the world salient and attractive or insignificant and 
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repellent, and to find different meanings in the same situations. For a woman, a half-empty 
cup found in a room might furnish a reminder of her daughter; for the woman’s husband the 
same cup might be a messy item needing to be moved into the kitchen. The different patterns 
of activity that result for men and women sediment into distinct repertoires of habit, 
reinforcing the initial impact of sexuation on perception. Overall, for Irigaray, these differing 
orientations structure desire, intentionality, anticipation, and habit along dual lines, pervading 
our embodied perception so deeply that, she says, sexuate difference is ontological, not 
ontic.xxiv 
 Irigaray provides a phenomenological justification for these views. First, 
phenomenology discloses the body’s fundamental ambiguity, whereby the sexuate bodies that 
we have (as Körper) are also the bodies (Leiber) that we as perceivers are, so that the living 
structures of our bodies constitute, not merely qualify, how we perceive.xxv Yet it is not 
immediately evident that every single bodily structure exerts an equally constitutive influence 
on perception. Here, second, Irigaray maintains that it is immediately evident to perception 
not only that we have sexuate bodies but also that we perceive in sexually distinct ways – at 
least, if we can suspend inherited false assumptions about subjectivity being gender-neutral. 
In that case, we can directly perceive that our sexuate bodily structures do constitute how we 
experience. 
 This exposes a potential fault line between phenomenology and feminism. If our 
experience is indeed polarised along sexuate lines, plausibly this is because of the binary 
gender norms that are institutionalised in our society. These norms constrain how we act and 
experience, causing us to become more sharply sexually polarised than we would otherwise 
be. Arguably, then, what Irigaray treats as directly evident – that our perceptions, desires, 
habits diverge along sexuate lines – is only given to perception because society has first made 
it a reality. The worry here is that phenomenological attention to perceptible givens may 
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discourage explanation and critique of how these givens have come about – i.e. through social 
forces that can be changed. 
 Arguably, another effect of society’s binary gender norms is that we learn to perceive 
one another to be sharply sexually differentiated. We become habituated to overlook the 
myriad occasions when people diverge from and blur the binary divide, and attuned to find 
salient the actions and expressions that conform to the divide. So, again, it is plausible that the 
sexuate worlds that (Irigaray holds) are given to perception are actually given only because 
societal norms have first trained us to find them. Our perception of sexually divided worlds is 
learnt, not spontaneous; and, rather than comprising a source of pre-theoretical certainty, this 
perception actually distorts the perceptible evidence of bodily plurality that overflows the 
binary norm. 
 However, the very fact that this corporeal diversity is perceptible if we can train 
ourselves to bracket assumptions about binary gender shows that phenomenology can work 
together with and need not discourage suspicion of binary gender norms. When we practise 
suspicion towards these norms, we re-learn to apprehend the corporeal diversity that is there 
to be perceived but which binary norms have trained us to overlook. Moreover, this 
perceptible diversity need not entail that sexuate differences between bodies and forms of 
experience are merely artefacts of binary gender norms. Irigaray’s work provides a salutary 
reminder of the perceptible differences between our sexuate forms and powers: in particular, 
women of child-bearing age can generally carry, bear, and breast-feed babies as men cannot. 
These differences are not wholly effects of social construction – after all, they are continuous 
with similar differences running through much of the mammalian world. Our somatic 
plurality must therefore be consistent with sexuate difference existing, to some extent, 
independently of society. The two can indeed be consistent if sexuate difference is not 
intrinsically a sharp, polarised divide and if its expansion into a sharp polarity that excludes 
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somatic diversity is an effect of social norms. Without that amplification, the ways that men 
and women experience and act will often overlap; there will be wide variations within the 
forms of experience that women have and within those that men have; some women will 
experience in a way more similar to some men than to some women, and reciprocally. The 
more we learn to look beyond binary gender norms, the more we will find evidence that 
where sexuate difference exists it takes this non-polarised form. But in that case we should 
not expect direct perception to evidence a radical difference in sexuate worlds. 
 Indeed, that perception does not furnish such evidence (despite the influence of binary 
gender norms) is implied by Irigaray’s own claim that women prioritise intersubjectivity and 
men subject-object relations. This claim presupposes that men and women alike apprehend 
the world as populated by both subjects and objects. For Irigaray, men and women differ in 
which of these axes they find more significant and salient; but to prioritise one axis over the 
other, women and men must both perceive both objects and subjects and weight each axis 
differently. By implication, sexuate difference in experience is a difference in the levels of 
emphasis that men and women give to subjects and objects, thus a difference of degree, not 
kind. But if the difference is one of degree, then we would expect some women to adopt an 
orientation closer to that of some men, whilst other women and men will be further apart – so 
that the differences between women will sometimes exceed those between men and women. 
Sexuate difference is not a sharp line. 
 Similar conclusions follow from Irigaray’s elemental materialism. Air, she tells us, is 
‘the universal matter of the living’.xxvi We all breathe; we can remain alive only while we 
remain in continuous, unbroken contact with air – drawing air in, returning air out. To be 
born, to enter into the shared world, is to begin breathing, living in the air, and with it to begin 
communicating with others through the perturbations of air that constitute sound. The 
newborn infant takes its first breath and generally, with it, its first cry. Only as breathers, then, 
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do we perceive and share the world. Other elements are likewise vital for our being. Our 
bodies are composed of up to 80 percent water; water is a component of the blood, mucous 
and other fluids that, as they circulate (carrying air) and congeal, continuously form and re-
form the body’s physical structures. All these elements of the material composition of our 
bodies are, according to Irigaray’s own materialism, shared between the sexes. 
 Irigaray sometimes acknowledges this sharing by identifying air, water and other 
elements as factors that mediate between men and women, bringing them into alliance and 
permitting passage across their difference.xxvii But if air mediates, it does so by virtue of being 
shared, circulating between men and women – and, as it circulates, air cannot remain external 
to the bodies that breathe it in and out, because these bodies are fluid too. When air is drawn 
in, it interpenetrates a body, percolating through its boundaries and thresholds, feeding into its 
structures and processes. Thus each of us is, in part, the air that we breathe, along with the 
other fluids of which we are made. If air serves a mediating function, then, its very way of 
doing so – by interpenetrating bodies seamlessly – means that it provides men and women 
with a common material element. 
 Thus, Irigaray’s view that universal matters compose the world by entering into 
various more-or-less transient forms implies that there is a basic material continuity between 
men and women. Their differences in sexuate somatic structure arise as different forms of this 
shared elemental materiality – for bodily forms, after all, are forms of matter. Thus, from 
Irigaray’s elemental materialist perspective, sexuate difference presupposes a shared 
background of elemental matter. 
 This undermines Irigaray’s claim that the sexes occupy different worlds, for some of 
the corporeal processes and structures that constitute perception are sexually shared. 
Breathing, for one, constitutes how we perceive. As we saw earlier, we perceive bodies 
against the background of the whole world. But a fundamental part of the way that we 
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experience the world as one single whole to which all bodies and perceivers belong is by 
breathing its air, an all-pervasive medium that threads all beings together. Although it goes 
largely unnoticed, then, our continuous vital contact with air helps constitute the entire shape 
of our experience. But since air and breathing are common to all human bodies, the 
corresponding structural features of human experience – such as the sense of the world as a 
single whole – are also shared by men and women. 
 Irigaray’s strong claim about dual sexuate worlds is actually in tension with her 
elemental materialism, which supports a more moderate view of how far sexuation affects 
perceptual experience. On that view, sexuate differences qualify perception but do not divide 
it radically, because shared perceptual structures – such as the role of breath in mediating how 
we inhabit the shared world – result from men’s and women’s bodily constitution from the 
same elemental matters. We can therefore embrace Irigaray’s elemental materialism without 
having to endorse her problematic belief in dual sexuate worlds. Once extricated from that 
problematic belief, Irigaray’s materialism deserves to be developed further, for it does 
important work in rethinking basic ontological issues in a way that addresses the ecological 
crisis. 
 
i I thank Simon James and Tanja Staehler for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
ii I take this thesis to be consistent with Husserl’s diagnosis of the crisis of the European 
sciences – a crisis that for him arises because we have mistakenly come to identify the 
quantitative, modern scientific account of the world (derived from sense-qualities by 
abstraction) as the whole truth. See Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1970. 
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